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By the Numbers
THE RACE
36,000 registered 
runners in 2014, 
plus 1000s of unregistered “bandits”, 
including mass transportation to Hopkinton 
TRAFFIC CONTROL
26.2 miles on major roads
on a Monday starting in Hopkinton and passing through 
Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, 
Brookline, and ending in Boston
CROWD CONTROL
Over 1M spectators 
line city streets to 
watch the marathon
MEDIA
2,200media 
credentials, 
representing 260
media outlets from over 30 countries
PUBLIC SAFETY
Over 3,500 police officers 
and 1000s of other first 
responders patrol and 
support
VOLUNTEERS
Over 10,000
volunteers are deployed 
by the BAA along the 
Marathon course
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Roles and Responsibilities 
 Maintain situational awareness and a 
common operating picture
 Manage resource requests and support 8 
host cities and towns
 Staffed by 250 representatives of 60+ local, 
regional, state, federal, private, and 
volunteer organizations
 Manage 10,000 volunteers
 Provide services to race participants
 Operate medical tents
 Provide transportation, including shuttle 
buses to starting line
Public Safety Multi-
Agency Coordination 
Center (MACC)
Boston Athletic 
Association (BAA)
 Prepare for race day
o Train first responders
o Produce 2 videos (Roll Call & Volunteer)
o Conduct tabletop exercises
o Manage See Something, Say Something 
public campaign
 Coordinate multi-jurisdictional public safety 
operations and decision making
o Interoperable communications
o Law enforcement tactical operations 
(SWAT/STOP)
o Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD)
o Weapons Detection Teams (CBRN)
o Intelligence and investigation
o EMS and mass casualty response
o Course disruption response
Over 700 police officers, firefighters, EMTs, 
and paramedics attended pre-Marathon training 
and 400 participated in tabletop exercises
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Command Structure
Public Safety Multi-Agency Coordination 
Center hosted by the Massachusetts 
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
MACC Manager
Unified Coordination Group 
(UCG)
Planning Operations
Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) and 
Community Support
Law Enforcement 
Support
EMS/Mass Casualty 
Support Resource Support
Logistics Finance
Emergency Operations 
Centers (EOCs)
Command Posts (CPs)
Operations/ 
Coordination Centers
BAA Race Operations 
Center
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Mass Casualty Response Command
 Medical preparedness was high 
following usually hot 2012 Marathon 
(with 275 people transported to hospitals)
 The Medical Intelligence Center at the 
Boston Public Health Commission was a 
coordination center for Boston public 
health and healthcare
o Activates for major events and disasters
o Shares information across health care 
providers and responders
• Information on patients
• Hospital supply needs
• Ongoing security updates
• Services available to victims
o Coordinates critical resources
o Supports medical surge capabilities for 
hospitals and health centers 
 Boston Public Health Commission 
Department Operations Center 
 Boston Emergency Medical Services 
Dispatch Operations Center
o Coordinates EMS field providers and area 
hospitals
o Manages EMS channel usage
o Provides EMS resource information
o Offers command and control assistance
 6 area Level 1 Trauma Centers had their 
emergency systems activated on race day
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Electronic Assets and Tools
Primary platform 
for information 
sharing 
 Information entered by MACC, EOCs, CPs, 
and other coordination centers
 3 WebEOCs are active during the Marathon 
(MEMA, City of Boston, and DPH)
 Tracks information near course on:
o Road closures, reopenings
o Status of local reception centers
o Activation of command centers
o Calls to police, fire, and EMS
o Significant events and issues
o Potential race disruptions
o Detours of racers and stoppages
o Abandoned or suspicious packages
o Weather conditions
o Hazardous conditions
o Threats to public safety
o Incidents resulting in serious injury and mass 
casualty incidents
 Prepopulated and real-time GIS data
o Static layers about the course and host 
communities, including location and 
capabilities of medical tents
o Incidents and events from WebEOC
o Locations of mobile command posts
o Locations of escort vehicles
o Density of runners crossing timing mats
o Road closures and detours
 Graphic products include:
o Situation maps
o Briefing maps
o Live, interactive web maps
o Ad hoc maps to support command staff
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Electronic Assets and Tools
 Dedicated Interoperable Command Channel
 Health and Homeland Alert Network (HHAN)
o 13,000 users (public health, hospitals, 
community health centers, emergency 
preparedness, and the volunteer Medical Reserve 
Corps)
o Share info with Executive Decision Group
o Notify of convening conference calls
 Situational Awareness Statements and Urgent 
Matter Reports
o Disseminated via email
o Large distribution list
 National Weather Service weather tracking
and air hazards detection systems
 Periodic Briefings (scheduled and unscheduled 
using a dedicated conference call bridge)
 Public Warnings and Emergency Notifications
o Emergency Alert System 
o Wireless Emergency Alerts 
o Massachusetts Alerts app (powered by 
Ping4alerts!)
o Traditional media, websites, and social media 
postings
 Joint Information Center connected more 
than 30 Public Information officers by email
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Current Wireless Usage
 Interoperable LMR voice 
communications
 Text and email communications
 Pager notifications
 HHAN messages
 Remote access to RMS, CAD, and 
other mission critical systems
 Remote access to WebEOC and 
incident reporting systems
 Streaming video feeds
 GPS location tracking
 Interactive maps
 Wireless Emergency Alerts
 Massachusetts Alerts app
 Weather and air telemetry
RESPONDING TO THE MASS CASUALTY
INCIDENT
Topic 1:  Managing the MCI on the Scene
Topic 2:  Managing Surge Volume at Hospitals
Topic 3:  Identifying Victims and Reuniting Families
Topic 4:  Conducting Bomb Disposal Investigations
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Marathon Bombing Event Timeline
Monday, April 15, 2013
Early morning – MACC, Boston and other EOCs, Boston MIC, Boston 
EMS DOC, BPHC DOC, and other command centers activated
9:17 AM – Boston marathon races starts
11:56 AM – Elite runners begin to finish
2:49 PM – Two bombs explode near finish line; 3 people killed and 
282 injured, including 14 amputations;  Medical Tent A converted to 
serve as mass triage, trauma unit, and morgue
Afternoon – Command center set up at the Westin Copley Place 
Hotel, under the lead of the FBI;  12 block area crime scene closed 
Afternoon/Evening – Police and others respond to numerous false 
alarms, including backpacks near bombing site, reports of a bomb at 
the JFK Library, and a Code Red at the Moakley Courthouse
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Topic 1: Managing the MCI on the Scene
Post-Incident Operations 
 Medical Tent A transformed into mass 
triage and trauma unit with morgue
 Volunteers and bystanders became 
involved in first aid and victim 
transportation to Medical Tent A
 First responders surged on scene 
resources
 Boston EMS transported 30 “red tag” 
patients to hospitals within 18 minutes 
and all patients within 45 minutes
 150 separate HHAN messages were sent 
to 40,000 devices
Race Day Medical Resources
 800 medical volunteers & staff 
 26 medical tents, including 10 enhanced tents 
with ambulance support
 2 Medical Tents (A and B) with communications, 
100s of cots, laboratory sections, & other 
resources (focused on race-related injuries)
 16 first aid stations
 49 hydration stations
 100 wheelchairs & stretchers pre-positioned 
 3 Disaster Management Admin Teams tents 
 Numerous medical buses & ambulances 
 Added medical teams positioned after mile 20 
 EMTs & Paramedics deployed on bicycles/carts
 Prepositioned MCI trailers at mid-course
“I only wanna hear from the 984… 
Everyone else stay off the air!”
Boston dispatcher trying to prioritize communications over LMR
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Topic 2: Managing Surge Volume at Hospitals
Post-Incident Operations
 MIC, EMS notified hospitals of mass casualty 
situation
o Many learned of event through social media, apps
o Attacks occurred around shift changes, nearly 
doubling staff
 Patients distributed among 8 area hospitals 
 Incident commander assigned at each hospital
 Identified and conveyed evidence to 
investigators
 Used WebEOC and HHAN to communicate 
status, ED needs
Hospital Surge Trauma Procedures
 Mobilized trauma teams
 Cancelled scheduled surgeries & imaging
 Prepared equipment trays for vascular & 
orthopedic procedures
 Called orthopedics-manufacturer reps for 
extra hardware to be mobilized
 Contacted blood banks to secure blood 
supplies
 Coordinated between EDs for equipment
 Arranged added security as potential 
secondary targets
 BWH prepared HAZMAT 
decontamination units
“Massachusetts Hospital Association (MHA) cited 
WebEOC as the most effective tool during the 
Boston Marathon bombings to acquire and 
communicate important data concerning critical 
needs and resources.” FEMA, “Boston Marathon Bombings:  
The Positive Effect of Planning and Preparation on Response”
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Topic 3: Identifying Victims and Reuniting Families
Identifying Victims
 Many patients were not identified 
immediately
o Patients arrived without purses, wallets, or family
o Near issues with assigning test results and 
medications to the correct patient
 Influx of patients overwhelmed registration
 Once identified, hospitals shared patient 
identification with the MIC to locate families
Coordinating the Public
 There were 9,000 runners still on the course
 Each runner carries a course location chip
 Tens of thousands of racers, families, and 
spectators were separated by the chaos 
 Many IDs, wallets, and phones were not accessible 
 Roads were still blocked off for the race, others 
cordoned off near the blast site
 Commercial cellular and wireless was overloaded
 Drop in locations were set up to reunite families
 Seaport Hotel donated space for victim services
Another huge communication challenge posed by the bombing was identifying who was hurt, 
keeping track of them once they were hospitalized, and reuniting worried loved ones with their 
injured family members. JBJS-JOSPT Special Report, “It Takes a Team,” March 2014
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Topic 4: Conducting Bomb Disposal Investigations
“In the week of the Boston 
Marathon bombings, the Boston 
bomb squad and their partners 
went on 196 calls in five days, a 
pace to rival the worst of the 
Surge in Baghdad.”
Using Specialized Equipment
 Talon robots
 Logos XR200, portable x-ray units
 Total Containment Vessels
Coordinating Bomb Disposal Units 
 Local Law Enforcement:  Boston & 
Cambridge PDs
 County Law Enforcement:  Suffolk County, 
NY
 State Police:  MA, NH, NY, & CT
 Military:  MA Army National Guard (Camp 
Edwards) and US Navy (from Rhode Island)
 In all, 45 bomb techs and 40 K-9 handlers
Post-Incident Operations
 Dozen bomb techs stationed at the finish line 
with a call for available bomb techs to deploy
 Required rapid exam, including hand entry
o 1000s of abandoned personal items
o Eight propane tanks in a small car 2 blocks away
o Car full of fuel canisters in a downtown garage
 “Whac-A-Mole” game of bomb disposal
o Respond to abandoned vehicles and items; hits 
from K-9 units; tips from 911 and tip lines
o Threats at JFK Library and Moakley Courthouse
 Long shifts for bomb tech throughout event
 Disposal of unexploded pipe bombs
Wired Magazine,  October 25, 2013
CONDUCTING THE INVESTIGATION
Topic 5:  Managing Evidence and Leads
Topic 6:  Managing Competing Command Needs
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Marathon Bombing Event Timeline
Tuesday, April 16, 2013 
Morning – Victim Jeff Bauman gives description of 
suspect with backpack; authorities recover mangled 
parts of exploded device
Afternoon – At police request, the public and local 
businesses provided huge numbers of photos and videos 
for analysis
Wednesday, April 17, 2013
Afternoon – Several media outlets erroneously report 
arrest has been made; BPD and FBI deny report; 
President Obama signs emergency declaration for 
disaster assistance
Thursday, April 18, 2013
11:00 AM – City holds interfaith service at Cathedral of 
the Holy Cross with President Obama in attendance
Afternoon – President visits victims at Massachusetts 
General Hospital; First Lady visits victims at Boston 
Children’s and Brigham and Women’s Hospitals
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Topic 5:  Managing Evidence and Leads
Elements of the Investigation
 Victim statement helped focus 
attention on backpacks
 2,000+ other leads reported, 
including 911 and tip lines
 Multiple false reports
 FBI secured a warehouse in 
Boston’s Seaport District
o Half room to examine hundreds of 
pieces of collected evidence
o Half room to sift through hundreds of 
hours of video and thousands of 
pictures
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Topic 6: Managing Competing Command Needs
Post-Incident Command
 Most mobile command centers 
dependent upon AirCards for data
 Mobile command posts set up in close 
proximity 
 Numerous involved agencies, at all 
levels of government
 Commands may not fully understand 
how much bandwidth is being used
Command and Operation Centers
 MACC at MEMA
 Boston Unified Command Center
 FBI Investigation Command Post at the 
Westin Copley
 Governor’s Situation Center
 Mayors’ Situation Centers
 Secret Service Presidential Escort Team
 Watertown Command at the Arsenal Mall
 NEMLEC Command Center
 Medical Intelligence Center at the Boston 
Public Health Commission
 Boston Public Health Commission Dept
Operations Center
 Boston Emergency Medical Services 
Dispatch Operations Center
 MA State Police Command Center
 Boston Fire Department Command Center
 Numerous agency command posts
 Numerous tactical team commands
MANAGING THE MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
MANHUNT
Topic 7:  “Shelter in Place” and Door to Door Search
Topic 8:  Enhancing Situational Awareness (Mobile Command)
21Managing the Manhunt
Marathon Bombing Event Timeline
Thursday, April 18, 2013
5:00 PM – FBI releases photos of suspects (“black hat” and “white hat”)
10:30 PM – Suspects kill MIT Officer Collier; suspects hijack Mercedes SUV
and vehicle owner “Danny” and intent to head to NYC to bomb Times Square
Friday, April 19, 2013
12:15 AM – Carjack victim escapes from suspects and asks Mobil station clerk 
to call 911; police track suspects using iPhone and SUV GPS
12:00 to 12:50 AM – Suspects take hijacked SUV and Civic to Watertown; 
Watertown officer identifies brothers and radios for backup; gunfight ensues, 
including use of 200-300 rounds, 1 IED, and several “crude grenades”; 
Tamerlan is shot and hit by Mercedes SUV; MBTA Officer Donohue is shot and 
critically wounded; Dzhokhar rams police cars and flees  by car; police chase 
suspect and Dzhokhar flees on foot near corner of Spruce and Lincoln
1:35 AM – Tamerlan pronounced dead at Beth Israel Hospital
Early morning – Command center set up at the Arsenal Mall in Watertown
6:33 AM to 6:00 PM – Governor issues “shelter in place” advisory for Boston 
area; mass transit is shut down; reverse 911 calls ask people to stay indoors
Morning and afternoon – 20 block area of Watertown is cordoned off; police 
execute door-to-door search; 1,800 officers respond
Between 6:00 PM and 7:00 PM – Outside the search area, Watertown 
resident finds blood and body in boat in his backyard, calls 911; police re-
issue “shelter in place” advisory for Watertown residents
7:30 PM – Law enforcement include SWAT team members surround boat and 
open fire; MSP infrared camera captures image of Tsarnaev in boat; dozens of 
residents evacuated from area
8:45 PM – Second bombing suspect located on Franklin St and taken into 
custody and transported to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
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Across Jurisdictions
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/04/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack/
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Topic 7: “Shelter in Place” and Door to Door Search
Response to the Watertown Gunfight
 1,800 officers responded; many 
were “self deployed”
 Many out-of-area officers reported 
navigation issues within Watertown
 “Shelter in Place” decision made in 
consultation with the Governor and 
mayors
 Helicopters and SWAT teams aided 
search
 HHAN delivered another 20,000 
pings
Elements of the “Shelter in Place”
• Governor’s order/request for Watertown 
and Boston area
• Watertown and Somerville residents 
received reverse 911 calls
• Use of MA Alerts app and Wireless 
Emergency Alerts (WEA)
• Public transit, Amtrak, and taxi services 
suspended
• Major events canceled 
• A 20 block area of Watertown was cordoned 
off for door-to-door searches
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Topic 8: Enhancing Situational Awareness
Current Wireless Usage in Mobile 
Command Centers
 Dedicated voice communications 
channels
 Cellular calls
 Text messaging and email
 Pager notifications and HHAN
messages
 GPS locations and internet tools
 Access to some agency systems, 
criminal justice inquiries
 Streaming video feeds
“They’re shooting at us! They are throwing 
grenades at us! They threw a bomb at us 
out a window!”  Watertown Police Radio Communication
Electronic Assets
 Mobile command centers and vehicles 
 Command and Situational Awareness Tools
o MEMA’s WebEOC
o MIT Lincoln Laboratories’ Next Generation 
Incident Command System (NICS)
 Agency Operations Support Systems
o Incident Reporting System
o Computer Aided Dispatch 
o Records Management Systems
o 911 call and tip line record systems
o Forensic Information Systems
 Intelligence Systems
o Boston Regional Intelligence Center systems
o Fusion Center systems
 Boston EMS’s Central Medical Emergency 
Direction (CMED) System
 Public Camera Systems/ Video Feeds
 Detection Systems
o Shot detection systems
o NWS air hazard detection systems
 Traffic control systems
 Photo/video analysis tools (facial recognition)
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Wireless Needs of the Boston Marathon
 Establishment of Reliable 
Communications (Capacity and Coverage)
 Expanded Wireless Video and Telemetry
 Access to Mission Critical Systems
 Improved Field Incident Reporting
 Enhanced Tools in the Field
 Improved Tools to Manage Resource 
Assignments
 Tools to Manage Cross Jurisdictional 
Response and Tactical Teams
 Improved Tools to Manage Grid Searches
and Tactical Teams
 Better Support for Mobile Command 
Centers
 Shared Situational Awareness
 Improved, Shared Maps
 Integration with Next Generation 911 
 Improved Victim Identification and 
Tracking
 Enhanced Emergency Department 
Support Tools
 Inclusion of Temporary First Responders
 Reliable Public Communications 
 Better Options for Managing Equipment
The PSBO identified 73 potential needs based on the Boston Marathon to be 
considered in planning and designing the NPSBN.  These are included at the end of 
the Boston Marathon Case Study document.  
